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Abstract
An uncertain database is defined as a relational database in
which primary keys need not be satisfied. A repair (or possi-
ble world) of such database is obtained by selecting a maxi-
mal number of tuples without ever selecting two distinct tu-
ples with the same primary key value. For a Boolean query q,
the decision problem CERTAINTY(q) takes as input an un-
certain database db and asks whether q is satisfied by every
repair of db. Our main focus is on acyclic Boolean conjunc-
tive queries without self-join. Previous work [23] has intro-
duced the notion of (directed) attack graph of such queries,
and has proved that CERTAINTY(q) is first-order expressible
if and only if the attack graph of q is acyclic. The current
paper investigates the boundary between tractability and in-
tractability of CERTAINTY(q). We first classify cycles in
attack graphs as either weak or strong, and then prove among
others the following. If the attack graph of a query q contains
a strong cycle, then CERTAINTY(q) is coNP-complete. If
the attack graph of q contains no strong cycle and every weak
cycle of it is terminal (i.e., no edge leads from a vertex in the
cycle to a vertex outside the cycle), then CERTAINTY(q) is
in P. We then partially address the only remaining open case,
i.e., when the attack graph contains some nonterminal cycle
and no strong cycle. Finally, we establish a relationship be-
tween the complexities of CERTAINTY(q) and evaluating q
on probabilistic databases.
1 Introduction
Primary key violations are a natural way for modeling un-
certainty in the relational model. If two distinct tuples have
the same primary key value, then at least one of them must
be mistaken, but we do not know which one. This represen-
tation of uncertainty is also used in probabilistic databases,
where each tuple is associated with a probability and distinct
tuples with the same primary key value are disjoint probabilis-
tic events [18, page 35].
In this paper, the term uncertain database is used for
databases with primary key constraints that need not be sat-
isfied. A repair (or possible world) of an uncertain database
db is a maximal subset of db that satisfies all primary key
constraints. Semantics of querying follows the conventional
paradigm of consistent query answering [2, 4]: Given a
Boolean query q, the decision problem CERTAINTY(q) takes
as input an uncertain database db and asks whether q is satis-
fied by every repair of db. Notice that q is not part of the input,
C conf year city
PODS 2016 Rome
PODS 2016 Paris
KDD 2017 Rome
R conf rank
PODS A
KDD A
KDD B
Figure 1: Uncertain database.
so the complexity of the problem is data complexity. The re-
striction to Boolean queries simplifies the technical treatment,
but is not fundamental.
Primary keys are underlined in the conference planning
database of Fig. 1. Maximal sets of tuples that agree on
their primary key, called blocks, are separated by dashed lines.
There is uncertainty about the city of PODS 2016, and about
the rank of KDD. The database has four repairs. The query
∃x∃y(C(x,y, ‘Rome’)∧R(x, ‘A’)) (Will Rome host some A
conference?) is true in only three repairs.
The problem CERTAINTY(q) is in coNP for first-order
queries q (a “no” certificate is a repair falsifying q). Its com-
plexity for conjunctive queries has attracted the attention of
several authors, also outside the database community [5]. A
major research objective is to find an effective method that
takes as input a conjunctive query q and decides to which
complexity classes CERTAINTY(q) belongs, or does not be-
long. Complexity classes of interest are the class of first-order
expressible problems (or AC0), P, and coNP-complete.
Unless specified otherwise, whenever we say “query” in the
remainder of this paper, we mean a Boolean conjunctive query
without self-join (i.e., without repeated relation names). Such
queries are called acyclic if they have a join tree [3].
Our previous work [21, 23] has revealed the frontier
between first-order expressibility and inexpressibility of
CERTAINTY(q) for acyclic queries q. In the current work,
we study the frontier between tractability and intractability
of CERTAINTY(q) for the same class of queries. That is,
we aim at an effective method that takes as input a query
q and decides whether CERTAINTY(q) is in P or coNP-
complete (or neither of the two, which is theoretically pos-
sible if P6=coNP [14]). For queries with exactly two atoms,
such a method was recently found by Kolaitis and Pema [13],
but moving from two to more than two atoms is a major chal-
lenge.
Uncertain databases become probabilistic by assuming that
the probabilities of all repairs are equal and sum up to 1. In
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probabilistic terms, distinct tuples of the same block repre-
sent disjoint (i.e., exclusive) events, while tuples of distinct
blocks are independent. Such probabilistic databases have
been called block-independent-disjoint (BID). The tracta-
bility/intractability frontier of query evaluation on BID prob-
abilistic databases has been revealed by Dalvi et al. [8]. Here,
evaluating a Boolean query is a function problem that takes
as input a BID probabilistic database and asks the probabil-
ity (a real number between 0 and 1) that q is true. The de-
cision problem CERTAINTY(q), on the other hand, simply
asks whether this probability is equal to 1.
In previous work [23], we introduced the (directed) attack
graph of an acyclic query, and showed that CERTAINTY(q) is
first-order expressible if and only if q’s attack graph is acyclic.
In the current paper, we study attack graphs in more depth. We
will classify cycles in attack graphs as either weak or strong.
The main contributions can then be summarized as follows.
1. If the attack graph of an acyclic query q contains a strong
cycle, then CERTAINTY(q) is coNP-complete. This
will be Theorem 2.
2. If the attack graph of an acyclic query q contains no
strong cycle and all weak cycles of it are terminal (i.e.,
no edge leads from a vertex in the cycle to a vertex out-
side the cycle), then CERTAINTY(q) is in P. This will
be Theorem 3.
3. The only acyclic queries q not covered by the two pre-
ceding results have an attack graph with some nonter-
minal cycle and without strong cycle. We provide sup-
porting evidence for our conjecture that CERTAINTY(q)
is tractable for such queries. Our results imply that
CERTAINTY(q) is tractable for “cycle” queries q of
the form ∃∗(R1
(
x1,x2) ∧R2(x2,x3) . . . ∧Rk−1(xk−1,xk)
∧Rk(xk,x1)
)
. These queries arise in the work of Fux-
man and Miller [10]. The case k = 2 was solved in [22],
but the case k > 2 was open and will be settled by Corol-
lary 1.
4. Theorem 6 and its Corollary 2 will establish a
relationship between the tractability frontiers of
CERTAINTY(q) and query evaluation on probabilistic
databases.
Our work significantly extends and generalizes known results
in the literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section further discusses related work. Section 3 de-
fines the basic notions of certain conjunctive query answer-
ing. Section 4 defines the notion of attack graph. Sections 5
and 6 show our main intractability and tractability results re-
spectively. Section 7 establishes a relationship between the
complexities of CERTAINTY(q) and evaluating query q on
probabilistic databases. Section 8 concludes the paper and
raises challenges for future research. Several proofs have been
moved to an Appendix.
2 More Related Work
The investigation of CERTAINTY(q) was pioneered by Fux-
man and Miller [9, 10], who defined a class of queries q for
which CERTAINTY(q) is first-order expressible. This class
has later on been extended by Wijsen [21, 23], who devel-
oped an effective method to decide whether CERTAINTY(q)
is first-order expressible for acyclic queries q. In their
conclusion, Fuxman and Miller [9, 10] raised the question
whether there exist queries q, without self-join, such that
CERTAINTY(q) is in P but not first-order expressible. The
first example of such a query was identified by Wijsen [22].
The current paper identifies a large class of such queries (all
acyclic queries with a cyclic attack graph in which all cycles
are weak and terminal).
Kolaitis and Pema [13] recently showed that for every
query q with exactly two atoms, CERTAINTY(q) is either in
P or coNP-complete, and it is decidable which of the two is
the case. If CERTAINTY(q) is in P and not first-order ex-
pressible, then it can be reduced in polynomial time to the
problem of finding maximal (with respect to cardinality) inde-
pendent sets of vertices in claw-free graphs. The latter prob-
lem can be solved in polynomial time by an ingenious algo-
rithm of Minty [17]. Unfortunately, the proposed reduction is
not applicable on queries with more than two atoms.
The counting variant of CERTAINTY(q), which has
been denoted \CERTAINTY(q), takes as input an uncertain
database db and asks to determine the number of repairs of
db that satisfy query q. Maslowski and Wijsen [16, 15] have
recently showed that for every query q, the counting problem
\CERTAINTY(q) is either in FP or \P-complete, and it is de-
cidable which of the two is the case.
As observed in Section 1, uncertain databases are a re-
stricted case of block-independent-disjoint (BID) probabilis-
tic databases [7, 8]. This observation will be elaborated in
Section 7.
All aforementioned results assume queries without self-
join. For queries q with self-joins, only fragmentary results
about the complexity of CERTAINTY(q) are known [6, 20].
The extension to unions of conjunctive queries has been stud-
ied in [12].
3 Preliminaries
We assume disjoint sets of variables and constants. If ~x is
a sequence containing variables and constants, then vars(~x)
denotes the set of variables that occur in~x, and |~x| denotes the
length of~x.
Let U be a set of variables. A valuation over U is a total
mapping θ from U to the set of constants. Such valuation θ is
extended to be the identity on constants and on variables not
in U .
Atoms and key-equal facts. Every relation name R has
a fixed signature, which is a pair [n,k] with n ≥ k ≥ 1: the
integer n is the arity of the relation name and {1,2, . . . ,k} is
the primary key. The relation name R is all-key if n= k. If R is
a relation name with signature [n,k], then R(s1, . . . ,sn) is an R-
atom (or simply atom), where each si is either a constant or a
2
variable (1≤ i≤ n). Such atom is commonly written as R(~x,~y)
where the primary key value ~x = s1, . . . ,sk is underlined and
~y= sk+1, . . . ,sn. A fact is an atom in which no variable occurs.
Two facts R1(~a1,~b1),R2(~a2,~b2) are key-equal if R1 = R2 and
~a1 =~a2.
We will use letters F,G,H, I for atoms, and A,B,C for facts
of an uncertain database. For atom F = R(~x,~y), we denote by
key(F) the set of variables that occur in~x, and by vars(F) the
set of variables that occur in F , that is, key(F) = vars(~x) and
vars(F) = vars(~x)∪vars(~y).
Uncertain database, blocks, and repairs. A database
schema is a finite set of relation names. All constructs that
follow are defined relative to a fixed database schema.
An uncertain database is a finite set db of facts using only
the relation names of the schema. A block of db is a maximal
set of key-equal facts of db. If A ∈ db, then block(A,db)
denotes the block of db containing A. An uncertain database
db is consistent if it does not contain two distinct facts that are
key-equal (i.e., if every block of db is a singleton). A repair
of db is a maximal consistent subset of db.1
Boolean conjunctive query. A Boolean conjunctive query
is a finite set q = {R1(~x1,~y1), . . . , Rn(~xn,~yn)} of atoms. By
vars(q), we denote the set of variables that occur in q. The set
q represents the first-order sentence
∃u1 . . .∃uk
(
R1(~x1,~y1)∧·· ·∧Rn(~xn,~yn)
)
,
where {u1, . . . ,uk} = vars(q). The query q is satisfied by
uncertain database db, denoted db |= q, if there exists a
valuation θ over vars(q) such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
Ri(θ(~xi),θ(~yi)) ∈ db. We say that q has a self-join if some
relation name occurs more than once in q (i.e., if Ri = R j for
some 1≤ i < j ≤ n).
The restriction to Boolean queries simplifies the technical
treatment, but is not fundamental. Since every relation name
has a fixed signature, relevant primary key constraints are im-
plicitly present in all queries; moreover, primary keys will be
underlined.
Join tree and acyclic conjunctive query. The notions of
join tree and acyclicity [3] are recalled next. A join tree for
a conjunctive query q is an undirected tree whose vertices are
the atoms of q such that the following condition is satisfied:
Connectedness Condition. Whenever the same vari-
able x occurs in two atoms F and G, then x occurs
in each atom on the unique path linking F and G.
Commonly, an edge between atoms F and G is labeled by the
(possibly empty) set vars(F)∩vars(G). The term Connected-
ness Condition appears in [11] and refers to the fact that the
set of vertices in which x occurs induces a connected subtree.
A conjunctive query q is acyclic if it has a join tree. The sym-
bol τ will be used for join trees. We write F
L
a G to denote an
1It makes no difference whether the word “maximal” refers to cardinality
of sets or set-containment.
edge between F and G with label L. A join tree is shown in
Fig. 2 (left).
Certain query answering. Given a Boolean conjunctive
query q, CERTAINTY(q) is (the complexity of) the following
set.
CERTAINTY(q) = {db | db is an uncertain database such
that every repair of db satisfies q}
CERTAINTY(q) is said to be first-order expressible if there
exists a first-order sentence ϕ such that for every uncertain
database db, db∈CERTAINTY(q) if and only if db |=ϕ. The
formula ϕ, if it exists, is called a certain first-order rewriting
of q.
Purified uncertain databases. Let q be a Boolean con-
junctive query. An uncertain database db is said to be purified
relative to q if for every fact A ∈ db, there exists a valuation
θ over vars(q) such that A ∈ θ(q)⊆ db. Intuitively, every fact
in a purified uncertain database is relevant for the query. This
notion of purified database is new and illustrated next.
Example 1 The uncertain database {R(a,b), S(b,a), S(b,c)}
is not purified relative to query {R(x,y),S(y,x)} because it
contains no R-fact that “joins” with S(b,c). C
The following lemma implies that in the study of tractabil-
ity of CERTAINTY(q), we can assume without loss of gen-
erality that uncertain databases are purified; this assumption
will simplify the technical treatment. Notice that the query q
in the lemma’s statement is not required to be acyclic.
Lemma 1 Let q be a Boolean conjunctive query. Let db0 be
an uncertain database. It is possible to compute in polynomial
time an uncertain database db that is purified relative to q
such that
db ∈ CERTAINTY(q) ⇐⇒ db0 ∈ CERTAINTY(q).
4 Attack Graph
The primary key of an atom F gives rise to a functional de-
pendency among the variables that occur in F . For example,
R(x,y,z,u) gives rise to {x,y}→ {x,y,z,u}, which will be ab-
breviated as xy→ xyzu (and which is equivalent to xy→ zu).
The set K (q) defined next collects all functional dependen-
cies that arise in atoms of q.
Definition 1 Let q be a Boolean conjunctive query. We define
K (q) as the following set of functional dependencies.
K (q) = {key(F)→ vars(F) | F ∈ q} C
Concerning the following definition, recall from relational
database theory [19, page 387] that if Σ is a set of functional
dependencies over a set U of attributes and X ⊆U , then the
attribute closure of X (with respect to Σ) is the set {A ∈U |
Σ |= X → A}.
Definition 2 Let q be a Boolean conjunctive query. For every
F ∈ q, we define F+,q as the following set of variables.
F+,q = {x ∈ vars(q) |K (q\{F}) |= key(F)→ x} C
3
R(u, a, x) = F
S(y, x, z) = G
T (x, y) = H P (x, z) = I
{x}
{x, y} {x, z}
R(u, a, x) = F
S(y, x, z) = G
T (x, y) = H P (x, z) = I
Figure 2: Join tree (left) and attack graph (right) of query q1. The attack from G to F is strong. All other attacks are weak.
In words, F+,q is the attribute closure of the set key(F)with
respect to the set of functional dependencies that arise in the
atoms of q\{F}. Note that variables play the role of attributes
in our framework.
Example 2 Let q1 = {R(u,a,x), S(y,x,z), T (x,y), P(x,z)}.
A join tree for this query is shown in Fig. 2 (left). To shorten
notation, let F = R(u,a,x), G = S(y,x,z), H = T (x,y), and
I = P(x,z), as indicated in the figure. We have the following.
K (q1 \{F}) = {y→ xyz,x→ xy,x→ xz}
key(F) = {u} and F+,q1 = {u}
K (q1 \{G}) = {u→ ux,x→ xy,x→ xz}
key(G) = {y} and G+,q1 = {y}
K (q1 \{H}) = {u→ ux,y→ xyz,x→ xz}
key(H) = {x} and H+,q1 = {x,z}
K (q1 \{I}) = {u→ ux,y→ xyz,x→ xy}
key(I) = {x} and I+,q1 = {x,y,z} C
Definition 3 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query.
Let τ be a join tree for q. The attack graph of τ is a directed
graph whose vertices are the atoms of q. There is a directed
edge from F to G if F,G are distinct atoms such that for every
label L on the unique path that links F and G in τ, we have
L* F+,q.
We write F τ G if the attack graph of τ contains a directed
edge from F to G. The directed edge F τ G is also called an
attack from F to G. If F τ G, we say that F attacks G (or that
G is attacked by F). C
Example 3 This is a continuation of Example 2. Fig. 2 (left)
shows a join tree τ1 for query q1. The attack graph of τ1 is
shown in Fig. 2 (right) and is computed as follows.
Let us first compute the attacks outgoing from F . The path
from F to G in the join tree is F
{x}
a G. Since the label {x}
is not contained in F+,q1 , the attack graph contains a directed
edge from F to G, i.e., F
τ1 G. The path from F to H in
the join tree is F
{x}
a G
{x,y}
a H. Since no label on that path is
contained in F+,q1 , the attack graph contains a directed edge
from F to H. In the same way, one finds that F attacks I.
Let us next compute the attacks outgoing from H. The path
from H to G in the join tree is H
{x,y}
a G. Since the label {x,y}
is not contained in G+,q1 , the attack graph contains a directed
edge from H to G, .i.e., H
τ1 G. The path from H to F in the
join tree is H
{x,y}
a G
{x}
a F . Since the label {x} is contained in
H+,q1 , the attack graph contains no directed edge from H to
F . And so on. The complete attack graph is shown in Fig. 2
(right). C
Remarkably, it was shown in [23] that if τ1 and τ2 are dis-
tinct join trees for the same acyclic query q, then the attack
graph of τ1 is identical to the attack graph of τ2. This moti-
vates the following definition.
Definition 4 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query.
The attack graph of q is the attack graph of τ for any join tree
τ for q. We write F q G (or simply F  G if q is clear from
the context) to indicate that the attack graph of q contains a
directed edge from F to G. We write F
q
6 G if it is not the
case that F
q G. C
The attack graph of an acyclic query q can be computed in
quadratic time in the length of q [23]. Figures 4 and 5 show
attack graphs, but omit join trees. The main result in [23] is
the following.
Theorem 1 ([23]) The following are equivalent for all
acyclic Boolean conjunctive queries q without self-join:
1. The attack graph of q is acyclic.
2. CERTAINTY(q) is first-order expressible.
Finally, we provide two lemmas that will be useful later on.
Lemma 2 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query. Let
F,G be distinct atoms of q. If F G, then key(G)* F+,q and
vars(F)* F+,q.
Lemma 3 ([23]) Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive
query. Let F,G,H be distinct atoms of q. If F  G and
G H, then F  H or G F.
4
5 Intractability
The following definition classifies cycles in attack graphs as
either strong or weak. The main result of this section is
that CERTAINTY(q) is coNP-complete for acyclic queries q
whose attack graph contains a strong cycle.
Definition 5 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query.
For every F ∈ q, we define F,q as the following set of vari-
ables.
F,q = {x ∈ vars(q) |K (q) |= key(F)→ x}
An attack F  G in the attack graph of q is called weak if
key(G)⊆ F,q. An attack that is not weak, is called strong.
A (directed) cycle of size n in the attack graph of q is a
sequence of edges F0  F1  F2 . . . Fn−1  F0 such that
i 6= j implies Fi 6= Fj. Thus, cycle means elementary cycle.
A cycle in the attack graph of q is called strong if at least
one attack in the cycle is strong. A cycle that is not strong, is
called weak. C
It is straightforward that F+,q ⊆ F,q.
Example 4 For the query q1 in Fig. 2, we have the following.
K (q1) = {u→ ux,y→ xyz,x→ xy,x→ xz}
F,q1 = {u,x,y,z}
G,q1 = {x,y,z}
H,q1 = {x,y,z}
I,q1 = {x,y,z}
The attack F
q1 G is weak, because key(G) = {x} ⊆ F,q1 .
The attack G
q1 F is strong, because key(F) = {u} 6⊆ G,q1 .
One can verify that the attack from G to F is the only strong
attack in the attack graph of q1.
The attack cycle G
q1 H q1 G is weak. The attack cycle
F
q1 G q1 F is strong, because it contains the strong attack
G
q1 F . For the same reason, the attack cycle F q1 H q1 G q1 
F is strong. C
Example 4 showed that the attack graph of q1 has a strong
cycle of length 3, and a strong cycle of length 2. This is no
coincidence, as stated by the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query. If
the attack graph of q contains a strong cycle, then it contains
a strong cycle of length 2.
The following proof establishes that for every acyclic query
q whose attack graph contains a strong cycle, there exists a
polynomial-time many-one reduction from CERTAINTY(q0)
to CERTAINTY(q), where q0 = {R0(x,y),S0(y,z,x)}. Since
CERTAINTY(q0) was proved coNP-hard by Kolaitis and
Pema [13], we obtain the desired coNP-hard lower bound for
CERTAINTY(q). As the proof is rather involved, we provide
in Fig. 3 a mnemonic for the construction in the beginning of
the proof. To further improve readability, some parts of the
proof will be stated as sublemmas.
F+,q G+,q
F⊞,q
x
y
〈y, z〉〈x, y〉 ‘d’
〈x, y, z〉
vars(q)
Figure 3: Help for the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query
without self-join. If the attack graph of q contains a strong
cycle, then CERTAINTY(q) is coNP-complete.
Proof Since CERTAINTY(q) is obviously in coNP, it suf-
fices to show that it is coNP-hard. Assume that the attack
graph of q contains a strong cycle. By Lemma 4, we can as-
sume F,G ∈ q such that F  G F and the attack F  G is
strong. For every valuation θ over {x,y,z}, we define θ̂ as the
following valuation over vars(q).
1. If u ∈ F+,q ∩G+,q, then θ̂(u) = ‘d’ for some fixed con-
stant d;
2. if u ∈ F+,q \G+,q, then θ̂(u) = θ(x);
3. if u ∈ G+,q \F,q, then θ̂(u) = 〈θ(y),θ(z)〉;
4. if u ∈ (G+,q∩F,q)\F+,q, then θ̂(u) = θ(y);
5. if u∈F,q\(F+,q∪G+,q), then θ̂(u)= 〈θ(x),θ(y)〉; and
6. if u 6∈ F,q∪G+,q, then θ̂(u) = 〈θ(x),θ(y),θ(z)〉.
Notice that θ̂(u) can be a sequence of length two or three;
two sequences of the same length are equal if they contain the
same elements in the same order. The Venn diagram of Fig. 3
will come in handy: every region contains a boxed label that
indicates how θ̂(u) is computed for variables u in that region.
For example, assume u belongs to the region with label 〈x,y〉
(i.e., u ∈ F,q \ (F+,q∪G+,q)), then θ̂(u) = 〈θ(x),θ(y)〉.
We show three sublemmas that will be used later on in the
proof.
Sublemma 1 Let θ1,θ2 be two valuations over {x,y,z}. If
H ∈ q such that F 6= H 6= G, then {θ̂1(H), θ̂2(H)} is consis-
tent.
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Proof Sublemma 1 Let H ∈ q such that F 6= H 6= G. Assume
the following.
For every u ∈ key(H), θ̂1(u) = θ̂2(u). (1)
It suffices to show the following.
For every u ∈ vars(H), θ̂1(u) = θ̂2(u). (2)
We consider four cases.
Case θ1(x) = θ2(x) and θ1(y) = θ2(y). If θ1(z) = θ2(z),
then θ1 = θ2, and (2) holds vacuously. Assume next θ1(z) 6=
θ2(z). Then it follows from (1) that no variable of key(H) be-
longs to a region of the Venn diagram (see Fig. 3) that contains
z. Since z occurs in all regions outside F,q, we conclude
key(H) ⊆ F,q. Since K (q) contains key(H)→ vars(H), it
follows vars(H) ⊆ F,q. Since z does not occur inside F,q
in the Venn diagram, we conclude (2).
Case θ1(x) = θ2(x) and θ1(y) 6= θ2(y). By (1), no vari-
able of key(H) belongs to a region of the Venn diagram
that contains y. It follows key(H) ⊆ F+,q. Consequently,
vars(H) ⊆ F+,q. Since neither y nor z occurs inside F+,q in
the Venn diagram, we conclude (2).
Case θ1(x) 6= θ2(x) and θ1(y) = θ2(y). First assume
θ1(z) = θ2(z). By (1), no variable of key(H) belongs to a
region of the Venn diagram that contains x. Consequently,
key(H) ⊆ G+,q. It follows vars(H) ⊆ G+,q. Since x does not
occur inside G+,q in the Venn diagram, we conclude (2).
Next assume θ1(z) 6= θ2(z). By (1), no variable of key(H)
belongs to a region of the Venn diagram that contains x or z.
Consequently, key(H) ⊆ F,q ∩G+,q. It follows vars(H) ⊆
F,q ∩G+,q. Since neither x nor z occurs inside F,q ∩G+,q
in the Venn diagram, we conclude (2).
Case θ1(x) 6= θ2(x) and θ1(y) 6= θ2(y). By (1), no variable
of key(H) belongs to a region of the Venn diagram that
contains x or y. Consequently, key(H) ⊆ F+,q ∩G+,q. It
follows vars(H)⊆ F+,q∩G+,q. Since none of x, y, or z occurs
inside F+,q ∩G+,q in the Venn diagram, we conclude (2).
This concludes the proof of Sublemma 1. a
Sublemma 2 Let θ1,θ2 be two valuations over {x,y,z}.
1. θ̂1(F) and θ̂2(F) are key-equal ⇐⇒ θ1(x) = θ2(x).
2. θ̂1(F) = θ̂2(F) ⇐⇒ θ1(x) = θ2(x) and θ1(y) = θ2(y).
Sublemma 3 Let θ1,θ2 be two valuations over {x,y,z}.
1. θ̂1(G) and θ̂2(G) are key-equal ⇐⇒ θ1(y) = θ2(y) and
θ1(z) = θ2(z).
2. θ̂1(G) = θ̂2(G) ⇐⇒ θ1 = θ2.
We continue the proof of Theorem 2. Let q0 = {R0(x,y),
S0(y,z,x)}. The signatures of R0 and S0 are [2,1] and [3,2]
respectively. Let F0 = R0(x,y) and G0 = S0(y,z,x). In the re-
mainder of the proof, we establish a polynomial-time many-
one reduction from CERTAINTY(q0) to CERTAINTY(q).
coNP-hardness of CERTAINTY(q) then follows from coNP-
hardness of CERTAINTY(q0), which was established in [13].
Let db0 be an uncertain database. By Lemma 1, we can
assume that db0 is purified relative to q0. Let V be the set of
valuations θ over {x,y,z} such that θ(q0)⊆ db0. Since db0 is
purified, the following holds.
db0 = {θ(F0) | θ ∈ V }∪{θ(G0) | θ ∈ V }
Let db = {θ̂(H) | H ∈ q,θ ∈ V }. Since V can be computed
in polynomial time in the size of db0, the reduction from db0
to db is in polynomial time. Since q contains no self-join, the
set db is partitioned by the three disjoint subsets defined next.
dbF = {θ̂(F) | θ ∈ V }
dbG = {θ̂(G) | θ ∈ V }
dbrest = {θ̂(H) | H ∈ q,F 6= H 6= G,θ ∈ V }
Since dbrest is consistent by Sublemma 1, every repair of db
is the disjoint union of dbrest, a repair of dbF , and a repair of
dbG. In the next step of the proof, we establish a one-to-one
relationship between repairs of db0 and repairs of db.
The function map will map repairs of db0 to repairs of db.
For every repair r0 of db0, map(r0) is the disjoint union of
three sets, as follows.
map(r0) = {θ̂(F) | θ(F0) ∈ r0,θ ∈ V }
∪ {θ̂(G) | θ(G0) ∈ r0,θ ∈ V }
∪ dbrest
Clearly, the first of these three sets is contained in dbF , and
the second in dbG. By Sublemmas 2 and 3, for every θ ∈ V ,
θ(F0) ∈ r0 ⇐⇒ θ̂(F) ∈map(r0) (3)
θ(G0) ∈ r0 ⇐⇒ θ̂(G) ∈map(r0) (4)
To prove the ⇐= -direction of (3) (the other implications are
straightforward), assume A ∈map(r0) with A = θ̂(F). By the
definition of map, we can assume θ′ ∈V such that θ′(F0)∈ r0
and θ̂′(F) =A. From θ̂(F) = θ̂′(F), it follows by Sublemma 2
that θ(F0) = θ′(F0), hence θ(F0) ∈ r0.
The following sublemma states that map is a bijection from
the set of repairs of db0 to the set of repairs of db.
Sublemma 4 1. If r0 is a repair of db0, then map(r0) is a
repair of db.
2. For every repair r of db, there exists a repair r0 of db0
such that r =map(r0).
3. If r0,r′0 are distinct repairs of db0, then map(r0) 6=
map(r′0).
To conclude the proof of Theorem 2, we show:
db0 ∈ CERTAINTY(q0) ⇐⇒ db ∈ CERTAINTY(q).
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By Sublemma 4, it is sufficient to prove that for every repair
r0 of db0,
r0 |= q0 ⇐⇒ map(r0) |= q.
=⇒ Assume r0 |= q0. We can assume θ ∈ V such that
θ(q0)⊆ r0. Obviously, θ̂(q)⊆map(r0).
⇐= Assume map(r0) |= q. We can assume a valuation
µ over vars(q) such that µ(q)⊆map(r0).
Let τ be a join tree for q. Let H0
L1
aH1 . . .
L`
aH` be the unique
path in τ between F and G, where H0 = F and H` =G. For i∈
{0, . . . , `}, we can assume θi ∈ V such that µ(Hi) = θ̂i(Hi) ∈
map(r0). Let i ∈ {0, . . . , `− 1}. We show θi(x) = θi+1(x)
and θi(y) = θi+1(y). Since F  G F , the label Li contains
a variable ui such that ui 6∈ F+,q and a variable wi such that
wi 6∈ G+,q (possibly ui = wi).
Since ui ∈ vars(Hi)∩ vars(Hi+1), it must be the case that
θ̂i(ui) = µ(ui) = θ̂i+1(ui). Since y occurs in every region out-
side F+,q in the Venn diagram (Fig. 3) and ui 6∈ F+,q, it is
correct to conclude θi(y) = θi+1(y).
Likewise, since wi ∈ vars(Hi)∩ vars(Hi+1), it must be the
case that θ̂i(wi) = µ(wi) = θ̂i+1(wi). Since x occurs in every
region outside G+,q in the Venn diagram and wi 6∈ G+,q, it is
correct to conclude θi(x) = θi+1(x).
Consequently, θ0(x) = θ`(x) and θ0(y) = θ`(y). From
θ̂0(H0), θ̂`(H`) ∈ map(r0), H0 = F , and H` = G, it follows
θ0(F0),θ`(G0) ∈ r0 by (3) and (4). Since θ0 and θ` agree
on each variable in vars(F0)∩ vars(G0) = {x,y}, it follows
r0 |= q0. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2. 
6 Tractability
We conjecture that if the attack graph of an acyclic query q
contains no strong cycle, then CERTAINTY(q) is in P.
Conjecture 1 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query
without self-join. If all cycles in the attack graph of q are
weak, then CERTAINTY(q) is in P.
Notice that by Theorem 1, we know that Conjecture 1 holds
in the special case where q’s attack graph contains no cycle at
all. Theorem 2 and Conjecture 1 together imply that for ev-
ery acyclic query q, CERTAINTY(q) is either in P or coNP-
complete. In the following section, a somewhat weaker ver-
sion of Conjecture 1 is proved.
6.1 All Cycles are Weak and Terminal
We show a weaker version of Conjecture 1. In this weaker
version, the premise “all cycles are weak” is strengthened into
“all cycles are weak and terminal.”
Definition 6 A cycle in a directed graph is called terminal if
the graph contains no directed edge from a vertex in the cycle
to a vertex outside the cycle. A cycle is nonterminal if it is
not terminal. C
Example 5 Figure 4 shows the attack graph of the
acyclic query {R1(x,u1,u2,z), R2(x,u2,u1,z), R3(x,y,u3,u4),
R0(u, z)
R1(x, u1, u2, z)
R2(x, u2, u1, z)
R3(x, y, u3, u4) R4(x, y, u4, u3)
R5(y, u5, u6)
R6(y, u6, u5)
Figure 4: Attack graph. All cycles are weak and terminal.
R4(x,y,u4,u3), R5(y,u5,u6), R6(y,u6,u5)}. All attack cycles
are terminal and weak. C
Example 6 In the attack graph of Fig. 5, all cycles are weak,
but no cycle is terminal. C
Theorem 3 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query
without self-join. If all cycles in the attack graph of q are
weak and terminal, then CERTAINTY(q) is in P.
Notice that if a query q has exactly two atoms, then q is
acyclic and every cycle in q’s attack graph must be terminal.
Therefore Theorems 2 and 3 together imply the dichotomy
theorem of Kolaitis and Pema [13].
To prove Theorem 3, we need four helping lemmas. In sim-
ple words, the first lemma states that if we replace a variable
with a constant in an acyclic query, then no new attacks are
generated, and weak attacks cannot become strong.
Definition 7 Let q be a Boolean conjunctive query. If
~x = 〈x1, . . . ,x`〉 is a sequence of distinct variables and ~a =
〈a1, . . . ,a`〉 a sequence of constants, then q[~x 7→~a] denotes the
query obtained from q by replacing each occurrence of xi with
ai, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `}. If θ is a valuation, then θ[~x 7→~a] is
the valuation such that θ[~x 7→~a](~x) = ~a and θ[~x 7→~a](y) = θ(y) if
y 6∈ vars(~x). C
Lemma 5 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query
without self-join. Let F,G ∈ q. Let z ∈ vars(q) and let c be a
constant. Let q′ = q[z 7→c], F ′ = F[z7→c], and G′ = G[z 7→c]. Then,
the following hold.
1. q′ is acyclic.
2. If F ′
q′ G′, then F q G.
3. If F ′
q′ G′ and F q G is a weak attack, then F ′ q
′
 G′ is
a weak attack.
Lemma 6 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query. If
each cycle in the attack graph of q is terminal, then each cycle
in the attack graph has length 2.
Lemma 7 Let q be an acyclic Boolean conjunctive query
such that each cycle of the attack graph of q is terminal and
each atom of q belongs to a cycle of the attack graph.
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1. If the same variable x occurs in two distinct cycles of
the attack graph, then for each atom F in these cycles,
x ∈ key(F).
2. If F
q G is a weak attack, then key(G)⊆ vars(F).
The following lemma applies to queries with an atom
whose primary key contains no variables.
Lemma 8 Let q be a Boolean conjunctive query without self-
join. Let F ∈ q such that key(F)= /0. Let q′= q\{F}. Let~y be
a sequence of distinct variables such that vars(~y) = vars(F).
Let db be an uncertain database that is purified relative to q,
and let D be the active domain of db. Then the following are
equivalent:
1. db ∈ CERTAINTY(q).
2. db 6= /0 and for all ~b ∈ D|~y|, if F[~y 7→~b] ∈ db, then db ∈
CERTAINTY(q′[~y7→~b]).
The proof of Theorem 3 can now be given.
Proof Theorem 3 Given uncertain database db, we need
to show that it can be decided in polynomial time (in the size
of db) whether db ∈ CERTAINTY(q). Let D be the active
domain of db. By Lemma 1, we can assume that db is purified
relative to q.
The proof runs by induction on the length of q. For the base
of the induction, we consider the case where the attack graph
of q contains no unattacked atom (i.e., no atom has zero inde-
gree). CERTAINTY(q) is obviously in P if q = {}. Assume
next that q is nonempty.
Since all cycles of q’s attack graph are terminal and every
atom has an incoming attack, every atom of q belongs to some
cycle of the attack graph. By Lemma 6, the attack graph of q is
a set of disjoint weak cycles F1 G1 F1, . . . , F`  G` 
F` for some ` ≥ 1. For i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, let qi = {Fi,Gi}, and
let ~xi be a sequence of distinct variables that contains every
variable x ∈ vars(qi) such that for some j 6= i, x ∈ vars(q j).
By Lemma 7, vars(xi)⊆ key(Fi)∩key(Gi).
For i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, let dbi be the subset of db containing
every fact A with the same relation name as Fi or Gi. Call a
partition of dbi a maximal subset P of dbi such that for some
~a ∈ D|~xi|, for all A ∈ P, there exists a valuation θ such that
A = θ[~xi 7→~a](Fi) or A = θ[~xi 7→~a](Gi). The sequence ~a is called
the vector of partition P.
In words, each partition of dbi groups facts that can be
obtained from Fi or Gi by replacing the variables of ~xi with
the same fixed constants. For example, the attack graph in
Fig. 4 contains an attack cycle involving R3(x,y,u3,u4) and
R4(x,y,u4,u3). The sequence 〈x,y〉 contains the variables
that also occur in other cycles. The facts R3(a,b,c,d) and
R4(a,b,e, f ) both belong to the partition with vector 〈a,b〉.
Clearly, two facts that belong to distinct partitions of dbi
cannot be key-equal. It follows that each repair of dbi is a
disjoint union of repairs, one for each partition of dbi.
Let TdbiU be the smallest subset of dbi that contains
every partition P satisfying P ∈ CERTAINTY(qi). By
Lemma 7 and [13, Theorem 2], CERTAINTY(qi) is in P
for 1 ≤ i ≤ `. From the following sublemma, it follows that
CERTAINTY(q) is in P.
Sublemma 5 The following are equivalent:
1. db ∈ CERTAINTY(q).
2.
⋃
1≤i≤`TdbiU |= q.
For the step of the induction, assume that F is an unattacked
atom in q’s attack graph. Let~x be a sequence of distinct vari-
ables such that vars(~x) = key(F). By Corollary 8.11 in [23],
the following are equivalent.
1. db ∈ CERTAINTY(q).
2. For some~a ∈ D|~x|, db ∈ CERTAINTY(q[~x 7→~a]).
Let~y be a sequence of distinct variables such that vars(~y) =
vars(F)\key(F). Let q′= q\{F}. By Lemma 1, it is possible
to compute in polynomial time a database db′ that is purified
relative to q[~x 7→~a] such that
db∈CERTAINTY(q[~x 7→~a]) ⇐⇒ db′ ∈CERTAINTY(q[~x 7→~a]).
By Lemma 8, the following are equivalent:
1. db′ ∈ CERTAINTY(q[~x 7→~a]).
2. db′ 6= /0 and for all~b ∈ D|~y|, if F[~x~y 7→~a~b] ∈ db′, then db′ ∈
CERTAINTY(q′[~x~y 7→~a~b]).
By Lemma 5, all cycles in the attack graph of q′[~x~y7→~a~b]
are weak and terminal. By the induction hypothesis, it
follows that CERTAINTY(q′[~x~y7→~a~b]) is in P. Since the
sizes of D|~x| and D|~y| are polynomially bounded in the size
of db, it is correct to conclude that CERTAINTY(q) is in P. 
6.2 Nonterminal Weak Cycles
Theorems 2 and 3 leave open the complexity of
CERTAINTY(q) when the attack graph of q contains
one or more nonterminal weak cycles and no strong cycle. In
this section, we zoom in on acyclic queries AC(k), defined
next for k ∈ {2,3, . . .}, whose attack graph contains k(k−1)2
nonterminal weak cycles and no strong cycle. By showing
tractability of CERTAINTY(AC(k)), we obtain more sup-
porting evidence for Conjecture 1. As a side result, we will
solve a complexity issue raised by Fuxman and Miller [10].
Definition 8 For k≥ 2, let C(k) and AC(k) denote the follow-
ing Boolean conjunctive queries without self-join.
C(k) = {R1(x1,x2),R2(x2,x3), . . . ,Rk−1(xk−1,xk),
Rk(xk,x1)},
AC(k) = {R1(x1,x2),R2(x2,x3), . . . ,Rk−1(xk−1,xk),
Rk(xk,x1),Sk(x1,x2, . . . ,xk)},
where x1, . . . ,xk are distinct variables and R1, . . . ,Rk,Sk dis-
tinct relation names. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, relation name Ri is of
signature [2,1], and Sk is of signature [k,k]. C
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R1(x1, x2) R2(x2, x3)
R3(x3, x1)
S3(x1, x2, x3)
Figure 5: Attack graph of AC(3). All cycles are weak and
nonterminal
R1 1 2
a b
a b′
a′ b
R2 1 2
b c
b c′
b′ c
R3 1 2
c a
c a′
c′ a
S3 1 2 3
a b c′
a b′ c
a′ b c
a
b
c
a′
b′
c′
Figure 6: At the left: uncertain database that is purified
relative to AC(3). At the right: graph representation of
R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3. Note that the three cycles encoded in S3 are
clockwise.
Obviously, a query q is acyclic if it contains an atom F such
that vars(F) = vars(q). Therefore, AC(k) is acyclic because
the Sk-atom contains all variables that occur in the query. On
the other hand, C(k) is acyclic if k = 2 and cyclic if k ≥ 3.
For i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, the attack graph of AC(k) contains at-
tacks from the Ri-atom to every other atom. Figure 5 shows
the attack graph of AC(3). All attack cycles are weak, but
Theorem 3 does not apply because the cycles are nontermi-
nal.
CERTAINTY(C(k)) was claimed coNP-hard for all k ≥ 2
in [10]. Later, however, Wijsen [22] found a mistake in the
proof of that claim and showed that CERTAINTY(C(k)) is
tractable if k = 2. The complexity of CERTAINTY(C(k)) for
k ≥ 3 will be settled by Corollary 1.
Theorem 4 For k ≥ 2, CERTAINTY(AC(k)) is in P.
Proof (Extended sketch.) Let db be an uncertain database
with schema {R1,. . . , Rk, Sk}. By Lemma 1, we can assume
without loss of generality that db is purified relative to AC(k).
Let D be the active domain of db. For every i∈ {1, . . . ,k}, de-
fine type(xi) as the subset of D that contains a if for some val-
uation µ, µ[xi 7→a](AC(k)) ⊆ db. Since AC(k) has no self-join,
we can assume without loss of generality that i 6= j implies
type(xi)∩ type(x j) = /0.
a
b
c
a′
b′
c′
a
b
c
a′
b′
c′
Figure 7: Graph representation of two repairs (of the uncer-
tain database of Fig. 6) that falsify AC(3). The left cycle is
anticlockwise and not encoded in S3.
For example, assume Ri(a,b),R j(c,d) ∈ db with i < j.
Since a ∈ type(xi), b ∈ type(xi+1), and c ∈ type(x j), it fol-
lows that b 6= a 6= c and that b = c implies j = i+1.
The Ri-facts of db can be viewed as edges of a directed
graph (1 ≤ i ≤ k). This is illustrated in Fig. 6 for k = 3.
Let G = (V,E) be the directed graph such that V = D and
E = {(a,b) | Ri(a,b) ∈ db for some i}. Then, G is k-partite
with vertex classes type(x1), . . . , type(xk). Furthermore,
whenever (a,b) ∈ E and a ∈ type(xi), then b ∈ type(xi+1) if
i < k (and b ∈ type(x1) if i = k). It follows that the length of
every elementary cycle in G must be a multiple of k. Since db
is purified, no vertex has zero outdegree. We define C as the
set of cycles of length k such that if db contains Sk(a1, . . . ,ak),
then C contains the cycle a1,a2, . . . ,ak,a1.
Since db is purified, G is a vertex-disjoint union of strong
components S1, . . . ,S` (for some `≥ 0) such that for i 6= j, no
edge leads from a vertex in Si to a vertex in S j.2
In what follows, some vertices and edges of G will be
marked. It is straightforward that db 6∈ CERTAINTY(AC(k))
is equivalent to the following.
It is possible to mark exactly one outgoing edge for
each vertex of G without marking all edges of some
cycle in C .
(5)
We provide a polynomial-time algorithm for testing con-
dition (5). Marking one outgoing edge for each vertex will
create a cycle of marked edges in each strong component.
For each strong component Si, consider the following cases
successively and execute the first one that applies.
Case Si contains a cycle of length k that does not belong
to C . Such a cycle is illustrated by Fig. 7 (left). Mark all
vertices and edges of the cycle. Notice that the number of
cycles of length k is at most |V |k, which is polynomial in the
size of db.
Case Si contains an elementary cycle of length (strictly)
greater than k. Such a cycle is illustrated by Fig. 7 (right).
Mark all vertices and edges of the cycle. To see that this step
is in polynomial time, notice that the following are equivalent:
• Si contains an elementary cycle of length greater than k.
2A strong component of a graph G is a maximal strongly connected sub-
graph of G. A graph is strongly connected if there is a path from any vertex
to any other.
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• Si contains a path a1,a2, . . . ,ak,ak+1 such that a1 6= ak+1
and Si contains a path from ak+1 to a1 that contains no
edge from {a1,a2, . . . ,ak}×V .
The latter condition can be tested in polynomial time, because
there are at most |V |k+1 distinct choices for a1,a2, . . . ,ak,ak+1
and paths can be found in polynomial time.
Case neither of the above two cases applies. Conclude
that (5) is false.
If after the previous step every strong component contains
a cycle of marked edges, then it is correct to conclude that (5)
is true. Notice that every cycle of C now contains at least one
unmarked edge. We can achieve (5) by marking, for each yet
unmarked vertex, the vertices and edges on a shortest path to
some marked vertex. This can be done without creating new
cycles of marked edges. 
Since query C(k) is acyclic if k ≥ 3, attack graphs are not
defined for C(k) if k ≥ 3. Nevertheless, the following lemma
immediately implies that if CERTAINTY(AC(k)) is tractable,
then so is CERTAINTY(C(k)).
Lemma 9 Let q be a Boolean conjunctive query without self-
join. If q′ ⊆ q and every atom in q \ q′ is all-key, then there
exists an AC0 many-one reduction from CERTAINTY(q′) to
CERTAINTY(q).
Corollary 1 For k ≥ 2, CERTAINTY(C(k)) is in P.
Unsurprisingly, there exist acyclic queries q 6∈ {AC(k) | k≥
2} whose attack graph contains some nonterminal cycle and
no strong cycle. The complexity of CERTAINTY(q) for such
queries q is open.
7 Uncertainty and Probability
In this section, we study the relationship between the com-
plexities of CERTAINTY(q) and evaluating q on probabilis-
tic databases. The motivation is that, on input of an uncertain
database db, the problem CERTAINTY(q) is solved if we can
determine whether query q evaluates to probability 1 on the
probabilistic database obtained from db by assuming a uni-
form probability distribution over the set of repairs of db. We
show, however, that this approach provides no new insights in
the tractability frontier of CERTAINTY(q).
7.1 Background from Probabilistic Databases
In this section, we review an important result from probabilis-
tic database theory.
Definition 9 A possible world w of uncertain database db is
a consistent subset of db. The set of possible worlds of db
is denoted worlds(db). Notice that possible worlds, unlike
repairs, need not be maximal consistent.
A probabilistic database is a pair (db,Pr) where db is an
uncertain database and Pr :worlds(db)→ [0,1] is a total func-
tion such that ∑w∈worlds(db)Pr(w) = 1. We will assume that
the numbers in the codomain of Pr are rational. C
The following definition extends the function Pr to Boolean
first-order queries q.
Definition 10 Let (db,Pr) be a probabilistic database. Let q
be a Boolean first-order query. We define
Pr(q) = ∑
w∈worlds(db):w|=q
Pr(w).
In words, Pr(q) sums up the probabilities of the possible
worlds that satisfy q. C
Of special interest is the application of Definition 10
in case q is a single fact, or a Boolean combination of
facts. Notice that if (db,Pr) is a probabilistic database and
A1, . . . ,An are distinct facts belonging to a same block of db,
then Pr(A1∨A2∨·· ·∨An) = ∑ni=1Pr(Ai), because no possi-
ble world can contain two distinct facts that belong to a same
block.
Definition 11 Probabilistic database (db,Pr) is called block-
independent-disjoint (BID) if the following holds: whenever
A1, . . . ,An are facts of db taken from n distinct blocks (for
some n≥ 1), then Pr(A1∧A2∧·· ·∧An) =∏ni=1Pr(Ai). C
Theorem 2.4 in [8] implies that every BID probabilistic
database (db,Pr) is uniquely determined if Pr(A) is given
for every fact A ∈ db. This allows for an efficient encoding:
rather than specifying Pr(w) for every w ∈worlds(db), it suf-
fices to specify Pr(A) for every A ∈ db. In the complexity
results that follow, this efficient encoding is assumed.
Notice that we can turn an uncertain database db into a BID
probabilistic database by assuming that the probabilities of all
repairs are equal and sum up to 1. A consistent subset of db
that is not maximal, would then have zero probability.
Function IsSafe(q) Determine whether q is safe [8]
Input: q is a Boolean conjunctive query without self-join.
Result: Boolean in {true, false}.
begin
R1: if |q|= 1 and vars(q) = /0 then
return true;
R2: if q = q1∪q2 with q1 6= /0 6= q2, vars(q1)∩vars(q2) = /0
then
return IsSa f e(q1)∧ IsSa f e(q2);
/* a is an arbitrary constant */
R3: if
⋂
F∈q key(F) 6= /0 then
select x ∈⋂F∈q key(F);
return IsSa f e(q[x 7→a]);
R4: if there exists F ∈ q such that key(F) = /0 6= vars(F) then
select F ∈ q such that key(F) = /0 6= vars(F); select
x ∈ vars(F);
return IsSa f e(q[x 7→a]);
if none of the above then
return false;
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Definition 12 Given a Boolean query q, PROBABILITY(q)
is the following function problem: on input of a BID proba-
bilistic database (db,Pr), determine the value of Pr(q).
A Boolean conjunctive query q, without self-join, is called
safe if Algorithm IsSafe returns true. C
The following result establishes a dichotomy in the com-
plexity of PROBABILITY(q).
Theorem 5 ([8]) Let q be a Boolean conjunctive query with-
out self-join.
1. If q is safe, then PROBABILITY(q) is in FP.
2. If q is not safe, then PROBABILITY(q) is \P-hard.
7.2 Comparing Complexities
The following proposition establishes a straightforward re-
lationship between the problems PROBABILITY(q) and
CERTAINTY(q). The only subtlety is that a repair contains
a fact of each block, while a possible world and a block may
have an empty intersection (recall that possible worlds, unlike
repairs, need not be maximal consistent). In the statement of
this proposition, db′ restricts db to the set of blocks whose
probabilities sum up to 1.
Proposition 1 Let (db,Pr) be a BID probabilistic database.
Let db′ be the smallest subset of db that contains every block
b of db such that ∑A∈bPr(A) = 1. Let q be a Boolean con-
junctive query. Then the following are equivalent:
1. db′ ∈ CERTAINTY(q).
2. On input (db,Pr), the answer to the function problem
PROBABILITY(q) is 1.
The following theorem establishes a nontrivial relation-
ship between the complexities of CERTAINTY(q) and
PROBABILITY(q). Notice that the query q in the theorem’s
statement is not required to be acyclic.
Theorem 6 Let q be a Boolean conjunctive query without
self-join. If q is safe, then CERTAINTY(q) is first-order ex-
pressible.
Proof The proof runs by induction on the execution of Algo-
rithm IsSafe. Since q is safe, some rule of IsSafe applies to
q.
Case R1 applies. If q consists of a single fact, then
CERTAINTY(q) is obviously first-order expressible.
Case R2 applies. Let q = q1 ∪ q2 with q1 6= /0 6= q2 and
vars(q1)∩ vars(q2) = /0. Since q is safe, q1 and q2 are safe by
definition of safety. By the induction hypothesis, there exists
a certain first-order rewriting ϕ1 of q1, and a certain first-order
rewriting ϕ2 of q2. Obviously, ϕ1 ∧ϕ2 is a certain first-order
rewriting of q.
Case R3 applies. Assume variable x such that for every
F ∈ q, x ∈ key(F). By definition of safety, q[x 7→a] is safe. It
can be easily seen that db∈CERTAINTY(q) if and only if for
some constant a, db ∈ CERTAINTY(q[x 7→a]). By the induc-
tion hypothesis, CERTAINTY(q[x 7→a]) is first-order express-
ible. Let ϕ be a certain first-order rewriting of q[x 7→c], where
we assume without loss of generality that c is a constant that
does not occur in q. Let ϕ(x) be the first order formula ob-
tained from ϕ by replacing each occurrence of c with x. Then,
∃xϕ(x) of a certain first-order rewriting of q.
Case R4 applies. Assume F ∈ q such that key(F) = /0
and vars(F) 6= /0. Let ~x be a sequence of distinct variables
such that vars(~x) = vars(F). Let ~a = 〈a,a, . . . ,a〉 be a
sequence of length |~x|. By definition of safety, q[~x 7→~a] is
safe. By the induction hypothesis, CERTAINTY(q[~x 7→~a]) is
first-order expressible. From Lemma 8.6 in [23], it follows
that CERTAINTY(q) is first-order expressible 
Corollary 2 Let q be a Boolean conjunctive query without
self-join. If CERTAINTY(q) is not first-order expressible,
then the function problem PROBABILITY(q) is \P-hard.
For acyclic queries, the only complexities of
CERTAINTY(q) left open by Theorems 1, 2, and 3 concern
queries q with a cyclic attack graph (in particular, an attack
graph without strong cycle and with at least one nonterminal
weak cycle). For such a query q, CERTAINTY(q) is not first-
order expressible (by Theorem 1), hence PROBABILITY(q)
is \P-hard (by Corollary 2). Consequently, the probabilistic
database approach fails to provide further insight into the
tractability frontier of CERTAINTY(q). It turns out that the
queries q for which PROBABILITY(q) is tractable is a very
restricted subset of the queries for which CERTAINTY(q) is
tractable (assuming FP 6= \P and P 6= coNP).
8 Discussion
In the following, we say that a class P of function problems
exhibits an effective FP-\P-dichotomy if all problems in P are
either in FP or \P-hard and it is decidable whether a given
problem in P is in FP or \P-hard. Likewise, we say that a
class P of decision problems exhibits an effective P-coNP-
dichotomy if all problems in P are either in P or coNP-hard
and it is decidable whether a given problem in P is in P or
coNP-hard.
Recall from Section 2 that \CERTAINTY(q) is the count-
ing variant of CERTAINTY(q), which takes as input an un-
certain database db and asks how many repairs of db sat-
isfy query q. For the probabilistic and counting variants of
CERTAINTY(q), the following dichotomies have been estab-
lished.
Theorem 7 ([8],[15]) The following classes exhibit an effec-
tive FP-\P-dichotomy:
1. the class containing PROBABILITY(q) for all Boolean
conjunctive queries q without self-join; and
2. the class containing \CERTAINTY(q) for all Boolean
conjunctive queries q without self-join.
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Theorem 2 and Conjecture 1 imply the following conjec-
ture, which is thus weaker than Conjecture 1.
Conjecture 2 The class containing CERTAINTY(q) for all
acyclic Boolean conjunctive queries q without self-join ex-
hibits an effective P-coNP-dichotomy.
From Theorems 2 and 3, it follows that in order to
prove Conjecture 2, it suffices to show that an effec-
tive P-coNP-dichotomy is exhibited by the class containing
CERTAINTY(q) for all queries q whose attack graph contains
some nonterminal cycle and no strong cycle.
We confidently believe that the P-coNP-dichotomy of Con-
jecture 2 (if true) will be harder to prove than the FP-\P-
dichotomies established by Theorem 7, for the following
reasons. All problems PROBABILITY(q) that are in FP
can be solved by a single, fairly simple polynomial-time
algorithm which appears in [8]. Likewise, all problems
\CERTAINTY(q) in FP can be solved by a single, fairly
simple polynomial-time algorithm [15]. On the other hand,
CERTAINTY(q) problems in P seem to ask for sophisti-
cated polynomial-time algorithms. In their proof that Con-
jecture 2 holds for queries with exactly two atoms, Kolaitis
and Pema [13] made use of an ingenious polynomial-time al-
gorithm of Minty [17]. Our proof of Theorem 4 uses algo-
rithms from (directed) graph theory. Despite their sophistica-
tion, these polynomial-time algorithms only solve restricted
cases of CERTAINTY(q).
Notice also that by Corollary 2 and Theorem 1, the func-
tion problem PROBABILITY(q) is intractable for all acyclic
queries q with a cyclic attack graph. On the other hand, cycles
in attack graphs are exactly what makes Conjecture 2 hard to
prove.
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A Proofs of Section 3
Proof Lemma 1 In polynomial time, we can construct a max-
imal sequence db0
A1−→ db1 A2−→ db2 · · · An−→ dbn such that for
i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n},
1. Ai ∈ dbi−1;
2. there exists no valuation θ such that Ai ∈ θ(q) ⊆ dbi−1;
and
3. dbi = dbi−1 \block(Ai,dbi−1).
Clearly, dbn is purified relative to q. We show that for i ∈
{1,2, . . . ,n},
dbi−1 ∈ CERTAINTY(q) ⇐⇒ dbi ∈ CERTAINTY(q).
=⇒ By contraposition. Assume that r is a repair of dbi
such that r 6|= q. Then, r∪{Ai} is a repair of dbi−1 that fal-
sifies q. ⇐= By contraposition. Assume that r is a repair
of dbi−1 such that r 6|= q. Obviously, r\block(Ai,dbi−1) is a
repair of dbi that falsifies q. 
B Proofs of Section 4
Proof Lemma 2 Assume F  G. Let τ be a join tree for q.
Let F
L1
a F1 . . .
Lm−1
a Fm−1
Lm
a G be the path in τ between F and
G (m≥ 1).
We have Lm ⊆ vars(G). Since K (q\{F}) |= key(G)→
Lm and Lm * F+,q (because F  G), it must be the case that
K (q\{F}) 6|= key(F)→ key(G), hence key(G)* F+,q.
We have L1 ⊆ vars(F). Since L1 * F+,q (because F  G),
it must be the case that vars(F)* F+,q. 
C Proofs of Section 5
Proof Lemma 4 We show that if the attack graph of q con-
tains a strong cycle of length n with n ≥ 3, then it contains a
strong cycle of some length m with m < n.
Let H0 H1 H2 . . . Hn−1 H0 be a strong cycle of
length n (n ≥ 3) in the attack graph of q, where i 6= j implies
Hi 6= H j. Assume without loss of generality that the attack
H0 H1 is strong. Thus, K (q) 6|= key(H0)→ key(H1).
We write i⊕ j as shorthand for for (i+ j) mod n. If H1 
H1⊕2, then H0  H1  H1⊕2 . . . Hn−1  H0 is a strong
cycle of length n− 1, and the desired result holds. Assume
next H1 6 H1⊕2. By Lemma 3, H2 H1. We distinguish two
cases.
Case H2 H1 is a strong attack. Then H1 H2 H1 is
a strong cycle of length 2 < n.
Case H2  H1 is a weak attack. If H1  H0, then
H0 H1 H0 is a strong cycle of length 2< n. Assume next
H1 6 H0. Then, from H0  H1  H2 and Lemma 3, it fol-
lows H0 H2. The cycle H0 H2 H2⊕1 . . . Hn−1 H0
has length n− 1. It suffices to show that the attack H0 H2
is strong. Assume towards a contradiction that the attack
H0 H2 is weak. Then, K (q) |= key(H0)→ key(H2). Since
H2 H1 is a weak attack, K (q) |= key(H2)→ key(H1). By
transitivity, K (q) |= key(H0) → key(H1), a contradiction.
This concludes the proof. 
Proof Sublemma 2 1. =⇒ Obviously, key(F) ⊆ F+,q.
From G F and Lemma 2, it follows key(F)* G+,q. Thus,
we can assume u ∈ key(F) such that u ∈ F+,q \G+,q. Hence,
θ̂1(u) = θ1(x) and θ̂2(u) = θ2(x). Since θ̂1(F) and θ̂2(F) are
key-equal by the premise, θ̂1 and θ̂2 agree on all variables of
key(F). In particular, θ̂1(u) = θ̂2(u). It follows θ1(x) = θ2(x).
1.⇐= Assume θ1(x) = θ2(x). Since key(F) ⊆ F+,q, and
since neither y nor z occurs inside F+,q in the Venn diagram
of Fig. 3, it is correct to conclude that θ̂1(F) and θ̂2(F) are
key-equal.
2. =⇒ From F  G and Lemma 2, it follows
vars(F) * F+,q. Since key(F) ⊆ F+,q, we can assume
a variable u ∈ vars(F) \ key(F) such that u 6∈ F+,q. From
the premise θ̂1(F) = θ̂2(F), it follows θ̂1(u) = θ̂2(u). Since
y occurs in all regions outside F+,q in the Venn diagram,
we conclude θ1(y) = θ2(y). Finally, θ1(x) = θ2(x) follows
from item 1 proved before. 2.⇐= Assume θ1(x) = θ2(x)
and θ1(y) = θ2(y). Since vars(F) ⊆ F,q, and since z does
not occur inside F,q in the Venn diagram, it is correct
to conclude θ̂1(F) = θ̂2(F). This concludes the proof of
Sublemma 2. a
Proof Sublemma 3 1. =⇒ Obviously, key(G) ⊆ G+,q.
Since F  G is a strong attack, key(G) * F,q. We can as-
sume u ∈ key(G) such that u ∈ G+,q \F,q. Consequently,
θ̂1(u) = 〈θ1(y),θ1(z)〉 and θ̂2(u) = 〈θ2(y),θ2(z)〉. Since
θ̂1(F) and θ̂2(F) are key-equal by the premise, θ̂1 and θ̂2
agree on all variables of key(G). In particular, θ̂1(u) = θ̂2(u).
It follows θ1(y) = θ2(y) and θ1(z) = θ2(z). 1.⇐= Assume
θ1(y) = θ2(y) and θ1(z) = θ2(z). Since key(G) ⊆ G+,q, and
since x does not occur inside G+,q in the Venn diagram, it is
correct to conclude that θ̂1(G) and θ̂2(G) are key-equal.
2. =⇒ From G  F and Lemma 2, it follows
vars(G) * G+,q. Since key(G) ⊆ G+,q, we can assume
a variable u ∈ vars(G) \ key(G) such that u 6∈ G+,q. From
the premise θ̂1(G) = θ̂2(G), it follows θ̂1(u) = θ̂2(u). Since
x occurs in all regions outside G+,q in the Venn diagram,
we conclude θ1(x) = θ2(x). Finally, θ1(y) = θ2(y) and
θ1(z) = θ2(z) follow from item 1 proved before. 2.⇐=
Trivial. This concludes the proof of Sublemma 3. a
Proof Sublemma 4 1. Assume r0 is a repair of db0.
We first show that map(r0)∩ dbF contains no two distinct
key-equal facts. Let A,B ∈ map(r0)∩dbF . We can assume
θ1,θ2 ∈ V such that θ1(F0),θ2(F0) ∈ r0, A = θ̂1(F), and
B = θ̂2(F). By Sublemma 2, if A and B are key-equal and
distinct, then θ1(F0) and θ2(F0) are key-equal and distinct,
contradicting that r0 is a repair. We conclude by contradic-
tion that map(r0)∩dbF contains no distinct key-equal facts.
In an analogous way, one can use Sublemma 3 to show that
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map(r0)∩ dbG contains no distinct key-equal facts. Since
dbrest is consistent, it follows that map(r0) is consistent.
We next show that map(r0) is a maximal consistent subset
of db. Let A ∈ dbF . We need to show that map(r0) contains
a fact that is key-equal to A. We can assume θ ∈ V such
that A = θ̂(F). Since db0 contains θ(F0) (by definition of
V ), r0 contains θ′(F0) for some θ′ ∈ V with θ′(x) = θ(x).
Consequently, map(r0) contains θ̂′(F). By Sublemma 2, A
and θ̂′(F) are key-equal. We conclude that map(r0) contains
a fact that is key-equal to A.
In an analogous way, one can use Sublemma 3 to show that
for every A ∈ dbG, map(r0) contains a fact that is key-equal
to A.
2. Let r be a repair of db. Let r0 be the following subset
of db0.
r0 = {θ(F0) | θ̂(F) ∈ r,θ ∈ V }
∪ {θ(G0) | θ̂(G) ∈ r,θ ∈ V }
We show r=map(r0). Since dbrest ⊆ r∩map(r0), it suffices
to show r \ dbrest ⊆ map(r0) and map(r0) \ dbrest ⊆ r. Let
A ∈ r\dbrest. Let A= θ̂(F), θ ∈V (the case where A= θ̂(G)
is analogous). Then by definition of r0, θ(F0) ∈ r0, hence
θ̂(F) ∈ map(r0). Conversely, let A ∈ map(r0) \ dbrest. Let
A = θ̂(F), θ ∈ V (the case where A = θ̂(G) is analogous).
By (3), θ(F0)∈ r0. We can assume θ′ ∈V such that θ̂′(F)∈ r
and θ′(F0) = θ(F0). By Sublemma 2, θ′(F0) = θ(F0) implies
θ̂′(F) = θ̂(F), hence A ∈ r.
Using Sublemmas 2 and 3, it is straightforward to show that
r0 is a repair of db0.
3. Let r0,r′0 be distinct repairs of db0. Then there exist
distinct key-equal facts A,B such that A ∈ r0 and B ∈ r′0.
Assume A,B are R0-facts (the case where A,B are S0-facts
is analogous). There exist valuations θ1,θ2 ∈ V such that
A = θ1(F0) and B = θ2(F0). By Sublemma 2, θ̂1(F) and
θ̂2(F) are distinct and key-equal. Since θ̂1(F) ∈map(r0) and
θ̂2(F) ∈map(r′0), and since map(r0), map(r′0) are consistent
by property 1 shown earlier, it follows map(r0) 6= map(r′0).
This concludes he proof of Sublemma 4. a
D Proofs of Section 6
Proof Lemma 5 1. Let τ be a join tree for q. Let τ′ be the
graph obtained from τ by replacing each vertex H with H[z7→c],
and by adjusting edge labels (that is, every label L is replaced
with L\{z}). Clearly, τ′ is a join tree for q′.
2 and 3. Let Q⊆ q. Let X ,Y ⊆ vars(Q). Let Q′ = Q[z 7→c].
In the next paragraph, we show that K (Q) |= X → Y implies
K (Q′) |= X \{z}→ Y \{z}.
The computation of the attribute closure {y |K (Q) |= X →
y} by means of a standard algorithm [1, page 165] corre-
sponds to constructing a maximal sequence
X = S0 H1
S1 H2
...
...
Sk−1 Hk
Sk
where
1. S0 ( S1 ( · · ·( Sk−1 ( Sk; and
2. for every i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,k},
(a) Hi ∈Q. Thus,K (Q) contains the functional depen-
dency key(Hi)→ vars(Hi).
(b) key(Hi)⊆ Si−1 and Si = Si−1∪vars(Hi).
Then, Sk = {y |K (Q) |= X→ y}. Consider now the following
sequence.
X \{z} = S0 \{z} H1[z7→c]
S1 \{z} H2[z7→c]
...
...
Sk−1 \{z} Hk [z 7→c]
Sk \{z}
Clearly, for every i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,k},
1. Hi[z 7→c] ∈ Q′. Thus, K (Q′) contains the functional de-
pendency key(Hi[z7→c])→ vars(Hi[z7→c]).
2. key(Hi[z7→c]) ⊆ Si−1 \ {z} and Si \ {z} =
(
Si−1 \{z}
)∪
vars(Hi[z 7→c]).
It follows that if K (Q) |= X → y and y 6= z, then K (Q′) |=
X \{z}→ y.
To prove 2, assume F
q
6 G. Then, the unique path in
τ between F and G contains an edge with label L such
that K (q\{F}) |= key(F)→ L. It follows K (q′ \{F ′}) |=
key(F ′)→ L\{z}. Since L\{z} is a label on the unique path
in τ′ between F ′ and G′, it follows F ′
q′
6 G′.
To prove 3, assume the attack F
q G is weak. Then
K (q) |= key(F) → key(G), hence K (q′) |= key(F ′) →
key(G′). It follows that the attack F ′
q′ G′, if it exists, is
weak. 
Proof Lemma 6 Assume each cycle in the attack graph
of q is terminal. Assume towards a contradiction that three
distinct atoms F,G,H of q belong to a same cycle such that
F  G and G H. By Lemma 3, F  H or G F . In
both cases, the attack graph contains a nonterminal cycle, a
contradiction. 
Proof Lemma 7 1. Let τ be a join tree for q. By
Lemma 6, every cycle in q’s attack graph is of the form
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H  H ′  H. We show that if H  H ′  H, then τ con-
tains an edge {H,H ′}. Assume towards a contradiction that
H  H ′  H and there exists I ∈ q such that H 6= I 6= H ′
and I lies on the (unique) path in τ between H and H ′. From
H  H ′, it follows H  I. Then the cycle H  H ′  H is
not terminal, a contradiction.
Assume variable x occurs in two distinct cycles of q’s at-
tack graph. We can assume disjoint cycles F  F ′ F and
G G′ G such that x∈ vars(F)∪vars(F ′) and x∈ vars(G).
Assume towards a contradiction x 6∈ key(F). By the Con-
nectedness Condition, if e is an edge on the unique path in
τ between F and G and e 6= {F,F ′}, then the edge label
of e contains x. Since the cycle F  F ′  F is terminal,
F 6 G. It follows x ∈ F+,q. Since x 6∈ key(F), we can as-
sume an atom H ∈ q such that H 6= F and key(H) ⊆ key(F).
From F  F ′ and Lemma 2, it follows H 6= F ′. By the
premise of the lemma, we can assume H ′ ∈ q \ {F,F ′} such
that H  H ′  H. By the Connectedness Condition, every
edge label on the path in τ between F and H contains key(H).
Let H
L1
a I1
L2
a I2 . . .
Lm−1
a Im−1
Lm
a Im with Im = F be the unique
path in τ between H and F . Two cases can occur.
Case I1 = H ′. From H ′ 6 I2, it follows L2 ⊆ H ′+,q. Since
key(H)⊆ L2, key(H)⊆ H ′+,q.
Case I1 6= H ′. Since H ′  H and H ′ 6 I1, it follows L1 ⊆
H ′+,q. Since key(H)⊆ L1, key(H)⊆ H ′+,q.
Hence, key(H) ⊆ H ′+,q. Then by Lemma 2, H ′ 6 H, a con-
tradiction. We conclude by contradiction x ∈ key(F).
2. Assume F
q G is a weak attack. Let
x ∈ key(G) \ key(F). By property 1 proved above, for
all H ∈ q \ {F,G}, x 6∈ vars(H). Since the attack F q G
is weak, K (q) |= key(F) → x. Since x does not occur in
q \ {F,G}, it must be the case that x ∈ vars(F). It follows
key(G)⊆ vars(F). 
Proof Lemma 8 Assume that F is an R-atom. Since db
is purified relative to q, we can assume that the set of R-
facts of db is R = {F[~y 7→~b1], . . . , F[~y 7→~b`]} for some ` ≥ 0 and
~b1, . . . ,~b` ∈ D|~y|. Since key(F) = /0, all facts of R are key-
equal.
1 =⇒ 2 Since db |= q, we have `≥ 1, hence db 6= /0. Let
r be a repair of db and i ∈ {1, . . . , `}. We need to show that
r |= q′[~y7→~bi]. Since (r\R )∪ {F[~y7→~bi]} is a repair of db, it
follows from the premise that (r\R )∪{F[~y 7→~bi]} |= q. Since
q contains no self-join, it follows (r\R ) |= q′[~y7→~bi], hence
r |= q′[~y7→~bi].
2 =⇒ 1 Let r be a repair of db. By the premise, for every
j ∈ {1, . . . , `}, r |= q′[~y 7→~b j ]. We can assume i ∈ {1, . . . , `}
such that F[~y 7→~bi] ∈ r. From r |= q′[~y7→~bi], it follows r |= q. 
Proof Sublemma 5 1 =⇒ 2 Let r = r1∪r2 be a repair of
db such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, for all partitions P of dbi,
• if P 6∈ CERTAINTY(qi), then r1 contains a repair of P
falsifying qi; and
• if P ∈ CERTAINTY(qi), then r2 contains a repair of P.
Since db ∈ CERTAINTY(q) by the premise, we have r |=
q. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, for every valuation θ, if θ(qi) ⊆ r,
then θ(Fi),θ(Gi) must belong to the same partition of dbi,
hence θ(Fi),θ(Gi) ⊆ r2. Consequently, r2 |= q. Since r2 ⊆⋃
1≤i≤`TdbiU, we have ⋃1≤i≤`TdbiU |= q.
2 =⇒ 1 Let r be a repair of db. Let ~x be a sequence of
distinct variables containing every variable x such that for
some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ `, x ∈ vars(qi)∩ vars(q j). By the premise,
we can assume ~a ∈ D|~x| such that ⋃1≤i≤`TdbiU |= q[~x 7→~a].
Let θ be the valuation over vars(~x) such that θ(~x) = ~a. For
1 ≤ i ≤ `, vars(~xi) ⊆ vars(~x). For 1 ≤ i ≤ `, define ~ai ∈ D|~xi|
as the sequence of constants such that ~ai = θ(~xi). Then, for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, TdbiU |= qi[~xi 7→~ai]. Since TdbiU contains
a partition with vector ~ai which belongs to CERTAINTY(qi)
(by construction), every repair of TdbiU satisfies qi[~xi 7→~ai].
Since r contains a repair of TdbiU, we conclude r |= qi[~xi 7→~ai].
Since ~x contains all variables that occur in two distinct
queries among q1, . . . ,q`, it is correct to conclude r |= q[~x 7→~a].
Since r is an arbitrary repair of db, db ∈ CERTAINTY(q). a
Proof Lemma 9 Let D be the set of uncertain databases.
We define a mapping f : D −→ D as follows. If db is an
uncertain database with active domain D, then f (db) is the
smallest set such that
• for every fact A ∈ db, if the relation name of A occurs in
q′, then A ∈ f (db); and
• whenever R(~x) in q\q′ and~a∈D|~x|, then f (db) contains
R(~a).
It is straightforward that f is first-order expressible and
db ∈ CERTAINTY(q′) ⇐⇒ f (db) ∈ CERTAINTY(q). 
Proof Corollary 1 By Lemma 9, there exists an
AC0 many-one reduction from CERTAINTY(C(k))
to CERTAINTY(AC(k)). Then by Theorem 4,
CERTAINTY(C(k)) is in P. 
E Proofs of Section 7
Proof Proposition 1 1 =⇒ 2 Let w ∈ worlds(db) such that
Pr(w) > 0. We need to show w |= q. From Pr(w) > 0, it
follows that for every block b of db, if ∑A∈bPr(A) = 1, then
w contains a fact of b. Consequently, there exists a repair r of
db′ such that r ⊆ w. Since r |= q by the premise, it follows
w |= q.
2 =⇒ 1 Let r be a repair of db′, hence r ∈ worlds(db).
We have Pr(r) > 0, because for every block b of db, if
∑A∈bPr(A) = 1, then r contains a fact of b. By the premise,
r |= q. 
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Proof Corollary 2 Assume CERTAINTY(q) is not
first-order expressible. By Theorem 6, query q is not safe. By
Theorem 5, PROBABILITY(q) is \P-hard. 
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